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Abstract
This paper investigates how changes in work-related factors affect
workers’ absence and presenteeism behavior. Previous studies (implic-
itly) assume that there is a substitutive relationship, i.e. a change in a
work-related factor decreases the level of absence and simultaneously
increases presenteeism (or vice versa). We set up a theoretical model
in which work-related characteristics not only affect a worker’s absence
decision but also the individual-specific sickness definition. Since work-
related factors affect presenteeism through these two channels, non-
substitutive relationships between absence and presenteeism are also
conceivable. Using European cross-sectional data, we find only few
substitutive and complementary relationships, while the bulk of the
work-related characteristics is related only to one of the two sickness
states.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Work-related Characteristics, Sickness Presenteeism and
Absence
It is well established that sickness absence and presenteeism, i.e. going
to work while sick, have negative economic effects through reduced or less
productive labor supply (for absence see Pauly et al., 2002; for presenteeism
see Pauly et al., 2008). Motivated by this stylized fact, a large number of
papers investigate the determinants of absence and presenteeism behavior.
Since most of the studies in this field look only at the determinants of one
of the two sickness states, the possibility that one factor might influence
absence and presenteeism behavior at the same time is neglected.1 Despite
this lack of empirical evidence, some studies assume that a determinant
which reduces absence leads to an increase in presenteeism (and vice versa)
and insinuate thus a substitutive relationship. This assumption, however, is
motivated rather implicitly by describing both sickness states as the result of
the same decision process (Aronsson and Gustafsson, 2005) or by deducing
hypotheses for determinants of presenteeism negatively from the literature
on absence (Bierla et al., 2013).
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature by explicitly and
comprehensively analyzing how factors influence both sickness absence and
presenteeism. Gaining a deeper insight of these interrelations is highly rel-
evant for (personnel) managers and policy makers because it clearly makes
a difference whether a factor aimed at reducing absence days is associated
with more, unchanged or even fewer presenteeism days. While a decline in
absence, c.p., is an economic improvement (for the manager, but of course
also for the society), reducing absence at the cost of more presenteeism could
reduce overall productivity, depending on the specific productivity effects of
presenteeism.2 On the contrary, economic improvement clearly survives in
1Only three studies (Bo¨ckerman and Laukkanen, 2009, 2010; Johansson and Lund-
berg, 2004) investigate both sickness states at once, and these will be discussed in more
detail below. In contrast, the bulk of the literature investigates either sickness absence
(for an early survey article, see Brown and Sessions, 1996; for literature using European
cross-country data, see Frick and Malo, 2008; Livanos and Zangelidis, 2013; Lusinyan and
Bonato, 2007) or presenteeism behavior (see Arnold, forthcoming; Aronsson et al., 2000;
Aronsson and Gustafsson, 2005; Bo¨ckerman and Laukkanen, 2009; Hansen and Andersen,
2008, 2009; Leineweber et al., 2011; Preisendo¨rfer, 2010).
2See Schultz and Edington, 2007 for a survey on the productivity effects of presenteeism.
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cases of unchanged or even lower presenteeism.
It is thus important to determine how different factors simultaneously
affect both sickness states. This is in particularly true for factors that man-
agers and policy makers can directly influence. For that reason, we focus on
the influence of work-related characteristics on both sickness states. In our
investigation, work-related characteristics comprise not only general features
of the employer-employee relationship such as firm size, contract type, work-
load, work autonomy and others but also specific human resources manage-
ment (HRM) practices such as piece rate, formalized performance evaluation
or production targets. To highlight mechanisms through which both sick-
ness states can be affected by work-related characteristics at the same time,
we build a simple theoretical model. Subsequently, we use a rich data set in
which indicators for sickness absence and presenteeism are compiled in one
survey such that we are able to simultaneously analyze how work-related
factors are correlated with both sickness absence and presenteeism.
In our theoretical model, the employee is hit by a non-binary health
shock which entails disutility from work (see Brown and Sessions, 2004 for
a similar approach). Comparing utility from being attendant at the work-
place with that of being absent, the individual optimally makes her/his
absence/attendance decision. This decision depends on work-related char-
acteristics because they affect costs and returns of attendance. Presenteeism
is given if an individual decides to be attendant at the workplace although
s/he considers her/his health shock as sickness. We assume that an individ-
ual regards herself/himself as sick if disutility from work is relatively high
and/or if productivity is relatively low. Because both determinants are af-
fected by work-related factors, the individual-specific sickness definition and
thus presenteeism can be influenced by those factors, too.
Our theoretical analysis shows that work-related characteristics can but
not necessarily have to imply a substitutive relationship between absence
and presenteeism, as is commonly assumed in the literature. Indeed, it can
be possible that a change in one work-related factor leads to an increase
(decrease) of both sickness states such that its interrelationship is comple-
mentary. Moreover, a change in one work-related factor might only influence
one sickness state, leaving the other unaffected. The central mechanism be-
hind these results is that presenteeism is affected through two channels.
Suppose that a change in one work-related factor makes it more likely that
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the individual is attendant at work, i.e. absence is reduced. Holding every-
thing else constant, this would also increase the probability of presenteeism
and hence imply a substitutive relationship. However, the same work-related
factor could also change the individual’s sickness definition. If s/he evaluates
fewer health shocks as sick, presenteeism could remain constant or could even
decline as a response to the changing work-related factor. Furthermore, our
theoretical model allows us to define illegitimate absence, i.e. absenteeism.
In this case, employees are absent although they do not consider themselves
sick.
In our empirical investigation, we estimate separately the relationship
between work-related characteristics and the number of sickness absence
and presenteeism days. For that purpose, we use the European Working
Conditions Survey (EWCS), a cross-sectional survey which covers 34 Eu-
ropean countries. This allows us to relate in OLS regressions 17 different
work-related characteristics of more than 18,000 employees to their sickness
absence and presenteeism behavior.3 Since there is no panel data on pre-
senteeism available, we cannot deliver causal analysis of the interrelation
between absence and presenteeism behavior, but our empirical investigation
offers several improvements in other dimensions compared to the existing
literature. We cover comprehensively work-related characteristics and use
the annual number of days of absence and presenteeism, which is a better
measure to investigate the relationship between both sickness states. In ad-
dition, we provide better external validity by using a large data set that is
representative for each European country and Europe as a whole.
The main results of the empirical analysis are as follows: First, we find
that only few work-related factors (namely supervisory status, over time and
flexible working time) lead to a substitutive relationship between absence
and presenteeism. This finding casts doubt on the predominant view in the
literature that both sickness states are interlinked in a substitutive manner.
Second, there are only two work-related factors (namely working conditions
and tenure) which lead to a complementary relationship between absence
3Specifically, we look at general work-related characteristics such as supervisory and
blue collar status, temporary contracts, tenure categories, whether working part or over
time, firm size, private sector employment, work autonomy, adverse working conditions,
support by coworkers and the management, flexible working time and time pressure. Fur-
thermore, we include HRM measures such as piece rate, formal performance evaluation
and production targets.
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and presenteeism. Specifically, averse working conditions and longer tenure
are positively correlated with both sickness states. Third, the bulk of the
considered work-related characteristics is only related to one of the two
sickness states while being uncorrelated with the other. From a managerial
and policy perspective, this suggests that it might be possible to reduce
absence (by regulating or setting the respective work-related factors) without
negative side-effects on presenteeism or to reduce presenteeism without the
threat of higher absence. Finally, we can identify three factors (namely
temporary contracts, employment in the private sector and firm size) that
seem to affect illegitimate absence since they are only highly significantly
related to absence while being unrelated to presenteeism. Our findings are
robust against count data models and in differently defined sub-samples.
1.2 Related Literature
There are only few studies that look empirically at both sickness states and
even fewer focusing on the interrelation between the two. Two Finnish stud-
ies investigate work-related determinants of both sickness states, but they
do not focus on their interrelation and use binary measures for both sick-
ness states (Bo¨ckerman and Laukkanen, 2009, 2010). In their first study,
they find that only few determinants are related to both sickness states, be
it complementary as shift work or substitutive as regular overtime. Only
one of the two variables of interest is related to both sickness states in their
follow-up study, while the other is only correlated with presenteeism. The
match between desired and actual working hours is associated with a lower
probability of sickness absence and presenteeism, whereas a strong empha-
sis of efficiency in the work place increases the likelihood of presenteeism.
The data set, however, is not representative for the Finish workforce since
it comprises only a small sample of Finnish trade union members. Further-
more, with employees deciding each day whether to come to work or stay
at home, the relation of work-related factors to absence and presenteeism
should be better measured in days than in incidence measures.
Johansson and Lundberg (2004) is the only study that explicitly investi-
gates the substitution between sickness absence and attendance, which they
refer to as ‘illness flexibility’. Contrary to their expectations, presenteeism
and absence have only a substitutive relationship with regards to attendance
requirements, but not with regards to adjustment latitude (the possibility to
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adjust work effort when ill). The latter is positively related to the frequency
of sickness absence for females, while not affecting presenteeism. There are
several differences in regards to our study. First, they use a very selective
sample that is taken from Stockholm county and additionally exclude all
respondents that report neither absence nor presence behavior. This sam-
ple selection could lead to biased estimates, if the excluded observations
are systematically related to the explanatory variables, which is quite likely.
Second, their dependent variable is measured in four vaguely defined ordinal
categories (never, once, a few times, many times). Finally, controlling only
for age, health, financial situation and family demands, the authors do not
sufficiently address potential omitted variable bias.
There are three theoretical studies analyzing sickness absence and pre-
senteeism behavior. Brown and Sessions (2004) enhance the Barmby et al.
(1994) model of absenteeism by including sickness presenteeism. While our
approach is inspired by their model, we depart in two ways. We do not focus
on shirking and detection technology but on the interrelation between sick-
ness absence and presenteeism. More importantly, we expand their model
by defining presenteeism through an endogenously determined definition of
sickness.
Chatterji and Tilley (2002) build a principal-agent model in which the
employer offers supra-mandatory sick pay to prevent unproductive presen-
teeism.4 Since they are interested in optimal contractual design, they define
presenteeism from the employer’s perspective as a situation in which the
employee is too unproductive. While we use a similar framework in which
bad health negatively affects the firms’ profits, we use a wider definition of
presenteeism that is closer to our observational data. Specifically, we fo-
cus on the employee’s perspective that does not only take productivity into
consideration but also disutility from work. Furthermore, the critical level
that defines sickness is a function of the work-related characteristics in our
model and not constant across individuals and firms.
Hirsch et al. (2015) present a theoretical model to deduce hypotheses
for presenteeism behavior which they empirically investigate with German
cross-sectional data. In contrast to the literature and our study, they offer
4Although this is a way to tackle presenteeism, monetary incentives alone seem to be
unable to solve this problem. This is underlined by the fact that employers complain
about unproductive presenteeism even in countries with mandatory full replacement of
the foregone wage as in Germany (Booz & Company, 2011).
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a very specific theoretical definition of absenteeism, i.e. a situation in which
attendance at the workplace of healthy employees is lower than under op-
timal incentives. This does neither match with sickness absence, as in our
case, nor with illegitimate absence.
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2,
we present our theoretical model and derive conditions under which work-
related factors imply a substitutive, complementary or no relationship be-
tween absence and sickness presenteeism. The empirical analysis is con-
ducted in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Model
In this section, we build a model that formalizes the absence/attendance
decision of individuals and shows under which conditions presenteeism is
conceivable. Furthermore, the model formalizes the influence of work-related
factors on the probability of absence and the probability of presenteeism.
2.1 Absence/Attendance
2.1.1 Utility
We consider an individual i who is employed at one particular firm. By
assumption, there is a contract between both which specifies the wage rate
wi > 0 and the working hours per day hi > 0. The individual is confronted
with a health shock δi which recurs on a daily basis. The random variable δi
is distributed over the interval [0, 1] with the density f(δi) and determines
the individual’s privately known health. The higher δi, the worse the health
shock is (see Brown and Sessions, 2004, for a similar approach).
The individual i’s utility has two possible realizations. If s/he is atten-
dant at the workplace, utility is given by:
Uhi = u
h (wi, T − hi, Xi)− u(δi, Xi), (1)
while in case of the individual’s absence from the workplace, we have:
Uai = u
a (si, T ) . (2)
The variable T stands for the individual’s endowment in time and si (0 ≤
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si ≤ wi) denotes the exogenously given firm-financed sick pay which the
individual receives in the case of absence. The sub-utility functions uh and
ua are increasing in consumption (wi and si) and leisure (T − hi and T ).
We assume that work-related characteristics Xi affect u
h and hence utility
from being attendant at work. In order to keep our framework as general
as possible, we use Xi as a vector that subsumes all relevant work-related
factors. Whether one particular work-related factor raises uh or reduces it,
is a priori unclear. For example, an improvement of the job security could
increase uh, whereas an impairment of working conditions could decrease it.
The function u represents the disutility from work conditional on the
individual’s health shock, with u(δi = 0) = 0 and ∂u/∂δi > 0. Moreover,
we presume that u depends on work-related characteristics. For example,
disutility at any given health shock could decrease if working conditions
are improved. Notably, we focus on the disutility that is conditional on
attendance and neglect the general disutility of different health shocks that
is independent of the absence/attendance decision (see Chatterji and Tilley,
2002 for a modeling approach in this respect).
2.1.2 The Individual’s Decision
Under which conditions does individual i decide to be absent (attendant)
from (at) the workplace? To find the answer to this question, we define a
threshold health level, denoted by θi, at which the individual i is indifferent
between attendance and absence. Formally, this requires Uhi (δi = θi) = U
a
i .
Using (1) and (2), we obtain:
B ≡ uh (wi, T − hi, Xi)− ua (si, T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
− u (θi, Xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
= 0, (3)
which implicitly determines θi.
5 After the health shock δi of the individual
i is revealed, s/he chooses to be attendant on this day if δi ≤ θi ⇔ B ≥ 0
holds; otherwise (δi > θi ⇔ B < 0) s/he chooses to be absent.
In line with the theoretical literature on absence (see, for instance, Brown
and Sessions, 1996), work-related factors affect the absence decision because
they influence the utility costs and returns of being attendant (see (3)). For
5Notably, we assume that 0 < ua(si, T ) < u
h (wi, T − hi, Xi) holds to ensure an interior
solution.
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example, better working conditions could reduce the disutility from work
and hence make absence less likely. This leads to the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 The threshold health level above which the individual chooses to
be absent from the workplace is (among others) a function of Xi and hence
influenced by work-related factors: θi = θi(Xi).
Because the individual i knows θi before the health shock is revealed,
it is possible to calculate the probability that the individual will be absent
from the workplace on a given day. Formally, the probability of absence is
given by Ai = Pr(θi < δi < 1) = F (θi < δi < 1), where F (δi) denotes the
distribution function of δi. Using the simplifying assumption of a uniform
distribution F (δi) = δi, we obtain:
Ai(Xi) = 1− θi(Xi). (4)
The probability of being attendant on a given day is given by Hi = 1−Ai.
2.2 Presenteeism
As standard practice in the literature, we define presenteeism as a situ-
ation where the individual is attendant at the workplace despite s/he is
sick (Arnold, forthcoming; Bo¨ckerman and Laukkanen, 2010; Hansen and
Andersen, 2008). In the previous subsection, we have shown under which
conditions individual i chooses to be attendant at the workplace but we
have not introduced a formal binary definition of sickness. We thus have
to determine under which conditions the individual considers her/his health
shock as sickness.
2.2.1 Definition of Sickness
In contrast to most of the existing literature, we assume that the definition
of sickness is endogenous and individual-specific. While the individual per-
ception of sickness might be shaped by several things such as social norms
and others, we focus here on two aspects that are related to work-related
characteristics: (i) the individual i’s evaluation of the health shock δi in
terms of utility, denoted by I, and (ii) the firm’s evaluation of the individ-
ual’s health shock in terms of productivity, denoted by F . The individual
i combines both factors to define a critical level of health φi, above which
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s/he considers her/his health shock δi as sickness. The threshold level φi
can hence be interpreted as the individual’s sickness definition. Formally,
this is given by:
φi = φi (I, F ) . (5)
Let us have a closer look to the determinants of the sickness definition,
starting with I. We assume that the individual’s own evaluation of her/his
health shock is driven by the associated disutility from work. If disutility
exceeds an exogenously given threshold Vi, the individual i evaluates a given
health shock as bad. At the margin, we can define a cutoff health shock δind
such that u(δi = δind, Xi) = Vi holds. Hence, any health shock that exceeds
δind is evaluated as bad by the individual. Because disutility from work is
affected by work-related characteristics, the individual’s evaluation of the
health shock is also influenced by Xi. If, for instance, working conditions
get worse, disutility increases and δind declines such that the individual
evaluates lower levels of δi as bad health shocks.
Turning to the determinant F , we assume that the health shock is consid-
ered bad from the firm’s perspective if the profit in case of the worker’s atten-
dance, Πhi , falls short of the profit in case of her/his absence, Π
a
i (see Chat-
terji and Tilley, 2002 for a similar approach). As for the individual’s evalua-
tion, we can define a cutoff health shock δfirm at which Π
h
i (δi = δfirm) = Π
a
i
holds. To calculate this cutoff, we have to specify the firm’s profit situation.
We define total profits of the firm as:
Π = pii + Y−i with Y−i =
N−i∑
n=1
pin, (6)
where pii denotes the profit produced by individual i and Y−i represents
aggregate profits generated by all other N−i workers. Taking the behavior
of the N−i workers as given, we obtain:
Πhi = r(hi, Xi)− r(δi)− wi + Y−i, (7)
Πai = −si + Y−i. (8)
Revenue per worker is denoted by r and positively depends on the hours
worked per day. In addition, it is also influenced by work-related character-
istics (summarized in the vector Xi), but as for the utility functions, the sign
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(and magnitude) of this effect depends on the specific work-related factor
considered. The function r(δi) measures the impact of the worker’s health
shock on the firm’s revenue. For simplicity, we assume that revenues de-
crease if the health shock becomes worse due to reduced productivity and
other related costs, with r(0) = 0 and ∂r/∂δi > 0.
6 In case of absence,
revenue of the individual is zero and hence not plagued by its health shock.
Furthermore, the firm has to pay the sick pay si instead of the wage wi.
Inserting (7) and (8) into the indifference condition above yields:
C ≡ r(hi, Xi)− r(δfirm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
− (wi − si)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
= 0. (9)
If δi ≤ δfirm ⇔ C ≥ 0 holds, the firm evaluates the individual’s health shock
as good or at least acceptable; otherwise (δi > δfirm ⇔ C < 0), the firm
considers the health shock as bad. Note that the firm cannot observe δi due
to our assumption that this is the individual’s private information.
Because profits are affected by work-related characteristics, the firm’s
evaluation also depends on Xi. For example, better working conditions
could raise profits in the case of the worker’s attendance, thereby implying
that even high levels of δi are not considered as bad health shocks from the
firm’s perspective. This yields to the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 The definition of sickness is individual-specific and (among oth-
ers) a function of Xi such that it is influenced by work-related factors:
φi = φi(I[δind(Xi)], F [δfirm(Xi)]).
2.2.2 The Individual’s Decision
With the threshold health level θi that determines the absence/attendance
decision and the (individual-specific) definition of sickness φi at hands, we
are able to show under which conditions presenteeism is conceivable, given
the optimal behavior of individual i. Suppose that θi > φi holds and that
the realized health shock of the individual lies in the interval φi < δi < θi.
6In general, bad health shocks reduce not only the worker’s productivity but have
further negative effects on the firm’s profit. For example, one worker could infect other
employees (see Barmby and Larguem, 2009) or could lead to distortions in situations
with production interdependencies (team production) as suggested by Pauly et al. (2008),
which both reduce profits. To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we do not model
these influences on the productivity of co-workers.
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As a consequence, s/he chooses to be attendant at the workplace because
δi is smaller than her/his threshold level, although s/he considers her/his
health shock as sickness. The individual’s decision – attendance despite
sickness – hence leads to a situation of presenteeism. Recall that there is a
daily health shock, implying that we measure presenteeism on a daily basis.
Similar to the absence/attendance decision, we can also compute the
probability of presenteeism on a given day. In general, this is given by
Pi = Pr(φi < δi < θi) = F (φi < δi < θi). Using F (δi) = δi, we obtain:
Pi(Xi) = θi(Xi)− φi(Xi). (10)
Suppose that instead θi < φi holds. Then, a health shock realization of
θi < δi < φi implies that the individual chooses to be absent although s/he
does not consider her/his health shock as sickness. We define this situation
as absenteeism of the individual. Note, however, that in a situation where
absenteeism is possible, there is no presenteeism by construction.
2.3 The Impact of Work-related Factors
2.3.1 Theoretical Effects
Our model shows that the probabilities of absence and of presenteeism de-
pend on the utility based threshold level θi and on the individual-specific
definition of sickness φi [see (4) and (10)]. In turn, both are affected by vari-
ations in work-related factors [see Lemma 1 and Lemma 2]. Hence, we can
use our model to shed light on the following question: How does a variation
in a work-related factor – holding everything else constant – influence both
the probability of absence and the probability of presenteeism per day? For
notational convenience, we suppress the index i in the following.
Suppose that one particular work-related factor included in the vector
X changes and denote this factor as x ∈ X. In general, we can distin-
guish three cases. First, the variation of x implies a decrease (increase) in
the absence probability, while the probability of presenteeism increases (de-
creases). Then, a change in x leads to a substitutive relationship between
absence and presenteeism. Second, the change in x leads to an increase
(or decrease) in both the absence and the presenteeism probability. Then,
the change in x entails a complementary relationship between absence and
presenteeism. Third, the variation in x is associated with a change (no
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change) in the probability of absence, while the probability of presenteeism
remains constant (changes). Then, x leads neither to a substitutive nor a
complementary relationship between presenteeism and absence.
To determine under which conditions a change in work-related factor x
leads to a substitutive, a complementary or no relationship between absence
and presenteeism, recall that variations of x influence θ and φ. Using (4),
we can show that the probability of absence increases (decreases) when θ
decreases (increases):
dA =
∂A
∂θ︸︷︷︸
=−1
dθ > (≤) 0⇔ dθ < (≥) 0. (11)
Regarding the probability of presenteeism, (10) indicates that changes in θ
and φ influence P . If dθ < 0 (and thus dA > 0) holds, we get:
dP =
∂P
∂θ︸︷︷︸
=1
dθ︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂P
∂φ︸︷︷︸
=−1
dφ < (≥) 0⇔ dφ ≥ 0 or dθ < dφ < 0 (dφ ≤ dθ < 0).
(12)
If dθ ≥ 0 (and thus dA ≤ 0) holds, we find:
dP =
∂P
∂θ︸︷︷︸
=1
dθ︸︷︷︸
≥0
+
∂P
∂φ︸︷︷︸
=−1
dφ > (≤)0⇔ dφ ≤ 0 or 0 < dφ < dθ (0 < dθ ≤ dφ).
(13)
With these conditions at hand, we obtain the following Propositions:7
Proposition 1 Presenteeism and absence are substitutes with respect to a
work-related factor x (i) if θ changes while φ is unaffected, (ii) if the varia-
tions in θ and φ are oppositional or (iii) if the changes of θ and φ have the
same sign but the (absolute) change in φ is sufficiently weak.
Proof. A substitutive relationship requires dA > (<)0 and dP < (>) 0.
From (11), we obtain dA > (<)0 ⇔ dθ < (>) 0. If dφ = 0 holds, Eqs. (12)
and (13) imply that dP < (>)0, which proves part (i) of the Proposition. For
dφ > (<)0, we also find dP < (>)0 as stated in part (ii) of the Proposition.
7As shown by (11), (12) and (13), the assumption of the uniform distribution implies
that the partial derivatives equal 1 respectively −1. This simplifies the derived Proposi-
tions because changes in θ and φ are weighted by 1 (in absolute terms). In Appendix A.1,
we prove that our qualitative findings are robust if the distribution of δ is not specified.
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Finally, Eqs. (12) and (13) indicate that dP < (>)0 holds if the absolute
change in φ is lower than the absolute change in θ: dθ < dφ < 0 (0 < dφ <
dθ). This proves part (iii) of the Proposition.
Proposition 2 Presenteeism and absence are complements with respect to
a work-related factor x if the changes in θ and φ have the same sign and the
(absolute) change in φ is sufficiently strong.
Proof. A complementary relationship requires dA > (<)0 and dP > (<)0.
Eq. (11) implies that dA > (<)0 ⇔ dθ < (>) 0. Observing (12) and (13),
we find that dP > (<)0 holds if the absolute change in φ is higher than the
absolute change in θ: dφ < dθ < 0 (0 < dθ < dφ).
Proposition 3 Presenteeism and absence are neither substitutes nor com-
plements with respect to a work-related factor x (i) if θ remains constant
while φ changes or (ii) if the changes in θ and φ are identical.
Proof. There is no relationship between absence and presenteeism if dA =
( 6=)0 and dP 6= (=)0 holds. From (11), we obtain dA = (6=)0⇔ dθ = (6=) 0.
Given dθ = 0, Eqs. (12) and (13) imply that dP 6= 0 ⇔ dφ 6= 0, which
proves part (i) of the Proposition. If dθ 6= 0 holds, we see from (12) and
(13) that dθ = dφ must hold in order to ensure dP = 0, which proves part
(ii) of the Proposition.
These findings are based on the assumption θ > φ. However, it can be
the case that the reverse relation is true: θ < φ. As discussed in section
2.2, there is then no presenteeism by construction, and we normalize its
probability to zero: P ≡ 0 ⇔ θ < φ. Note that in this scenario, the
probability of absenteeism, i.e. illegitimate absence, is positive.
Proposition 4 Presenteeism and absence are neither substitutes nor com-
plements with respect to a work-related factor x if θ < φ holds.
2.3.2 Empirical Examination
Theoretically, the effects of work-related factors on absence and presenteeism
are ambiguous, as shown by Propositions 1-4. Therefore, it is necessary to
investigate these effects empirically.8 In the following, we use data from a
8Note that, given the general form of the utility functions and the definition of sickness,
our theory cannot be used to find clear-cut predictions whether a particular work-related
factor leads to a substitutive, complementary or no relationship between absence and
presenteeism.
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cross-sectional survey where individuals self-report their absences and pre-
senteeism days during the last 12 months. In addition, we make use of a rich
set of work-related factors to analyze how they are – on average – related
to absence and presenteeism days.
With our theory at hand, we are able to disentangle the channels through
which work-related factors affect absence and presenteeism days in the data.
In this regard, three remarks have to be made. First, we interpret the annual
number of days in the data as the aggregated realization of daily absence
decisions in the model. Second, we do not model inter-temporal feedback
effects from presenteeism today to the health shock tomorrow to make our
theoretical model as simple as possible.9 In the annual data, of course,
such effects could not, at the first glance, be ruled out. To mitigate this
contradiction between theory and data, we make use of the particularly
rich health information available in the data set. An additional reason to
accommodate for the heterogeneity in health in the data as well as we can is
that our theoretical model is based on changes in the critical levels φ and θ
for a given health status δ. Third, we are not able to empirically investigate
intra-individual changes as described in the theoretical model because we
use cross-sectional data. Instead, we analyze differences between individuals
with regards to their absence and presenteeism behavior.
Suppose that a change in one work-related factor leads to more absence
days and less presenteeism days on average and implies hence a substitutive
relationship between both. The increase in absence can be explained by
a decline in the utility based threshold level θ. Holding everything else
constant, more absence implies that presenteeism is automatically reduced.
This effect on presenteeism survives if the sickness definition φ is unchanged
and is even amplified if the individual considers fewer health shocks as sick,
i.e. φ increases.
It can, however, also be possible that a change in one work-related fac-
tor implies more absence and more presenteeism days on average. If we
would find this complementary relationship in our data, the above men-
tioned change in absence has to be complemented by a sufficiently strong
decrease in the definition of sickness φ. Then, individuals are more likely
9While there is empirical evidence that presenteeism affects future health realizations,
these effects tend to be rather on the longer term than within twelve months as in our
case (Hansen and Andersen, 2009).
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absent (due to lower θ) which, c.p., reduces presenteeism, but also consider
more health shocks as sick (due to lower φ) which, c.p., increase presen-
teeism. If the latter effect is strong enough, a changing work-related factor
could induce a simultaneous increase in absence and presenteeism days.
The endogenous definition of sickness also helps us to explain why a
change in one work-related factor could lead to more presenteeism days (ab-
sence days), while leaving absence days (presenteeism days) unaffected. This
would be the case if the utility based threshold level θ does not vary with
the work-related factor while the definition of sickness φ changes (absence
remains constant) or if both are affected in the same way (presenteeism re-
mains constant). In addition, the constancy of presenteeism could also be
explained if the work-related factor has an impact on absence and absen-
teeism. This would be the case if the utility based health threshold level falls
short of the threshold level that defines sickness, implying that individuals
choose to stay at home although they do not consider themselves as sick.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Empirical Strategy
To analyze the impact of work-related characteristics on the relationship
between absence and presenteeism empirically, we use the fifth wave of the
EWCS, a repeated cross-sectional survey on working conditions in Europe.
The EWCS is conducted every five years by an agency of the European
Union and profits from a single questionnaire guaranteeing consistent data
across countries. In 2010, the EWCS covered for the first and only time
an item on sickness presenteeism and is hence the first large-scale survey
integrating information about sickness absence and presenteeism behavior.
It comprises the population aged 15 and above living in 34 European coun-
tries. In our investigation, we consider employees aged 18-65 years who have
been employed during the last 12 months prior to the interview and who
have been working at least 10 hours per week, excluding the self-employed,
students, apprentices, employees without work contracts and those working
two jobs.10
10The sample covers all 27 European Union member states, Albania, Croatia, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, and Turkey. Note further that we disregard employees
unrealistically claiming to work more than 80 hours per week. The results are not sensitive
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As the dependent variables, we use the annual duration of absence and
presenteeism measured in days. The sickness absence item reads as follows:
“Over the past 12 months how many days in total were you absent from
work for reasons of health problems?” The sickness presenteeism item asks:
“Over the past 12 months did you work when you were sick? a) Yes b) No.
If yes, how many working days?”
We prefer the annual duration of absence and presenteeism over inci-
dence or frequency measures for several reasons. First, the productivity
effects of sickness depend among others on how long the employee’s produc-
tivity is impaired by the sickness (see Pauly et al., 2008). Hence, the annual
duration of absence and presenteeism is a better proxy for productivity ef-
fects than their frequency or incidence. Second, since employees decide each
day whether to come to work or stay at home, the relation of work-related
factors to absence and presenteeism is better measured in days than in fre-
quency or incidence measures. Furthermore, it fits well with our theoretical
model describing daily absence decisions. Finally, asking for the number of
sickness presenteeism and absence days in an open question is better than
offering predefined frequency categories (as done by Johansson and Lund-
berg, 2004) because this avoids the establishment of reference points. Note
that we disregard outliers, i.e. those with either more than 50 sickness pre-
senteeism or 100 absence days within 12 months, resulting in a loss of around
150 observations. However, the central results do not depend on this sample
selection (see section 3.3). We also exclude those 30 employees with a very
bad health status. In total, the number of observations amounts to 18,804.
The descriptive statistics provided in Table 1 show that sickness absence
and presenteeism is a widespread and quantitatively relevant phenomenon
in Europe. In our sample, the average number of sickness presenteeism and
absence days amounts to 2.3 and 5.2, respectively. Conditioning on those
who go to work while sick at all leads to an average of almost seven presen-
teeism days. For absence, this number amounts to more than ten absence
days. There is a large cross-sectional variation with standard deviations of
more than five presenteeism days and over ten absence days.11
Since we are interested in how work-related characteristics are related to
to the exclusion of those either working less than 10 or more than 80 hours per week.
11The distribution of the conditional sickness presenteeism and absence days is shown
in Figure A.1 in the Appendix A.2.
16
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sickness presenteeism days 18,804 2.25 4.8 0 50
Sickness absence days 18,804 5.23 10.6 0 100
Work-related characteristics
Tenure (<1 years) 18,804 0.07 0.26 0 1
Tenure (1-2 years) 18,804 0.17 0.37 0 1
Tenure (3-14 years) 18,804 0.50 0.50 0 1
Tenure (≥ 15 years) 18,804 0.26 0.44 0 1
Flexible schedule 18,804 0.04 0.20 0 1
Work autonomy index 18,804 1.92 1.19 0 3
Supervisor 18,804 0.16 0.37 0 1
Part time (10-30h) 18,804 0.12 0.33 0 1
Over time (≥ 45h) 18,804 0.12 0.32 0 1
Lack of time to get work done 18,804 2.11 1.0 1 5
Adverse working conditions 18,804 2.81 2.60 0 15
Social support 18,804 5.60 1.93 0 8
Blue collar worker 18,804 0.33 0.47 0 1
Temporary contract 18,804 0.12 0.33 0 1
Size (<10 employees) 18,804 0.27 0.44 0 1
Size (10-49 employees) 18,804 0.34 0.47 0 1
Size (50-99 employees) 18,804 0.13 0.33 0 1
Size (100-249 employees) 18,804 0.11 0.31 0 1
Size (≥250 employees) 18,804 0.15 0.37 0 1
Private sector 18,804 0.67 0.47 0 1
Piece rate 18,804 0.12 0.33 0 1
Production target 18,804 0.43 0.50 0 1
Performance assessment 18,804 0.45 0.50 0 1
Source: 2010-EWCS. Own calculations, survey weights used.
absence and presenteeism behavior, we have to select specific work-related
factors and cover them empirically. In our cross-sectional model, this se-
lection of explanatory variables is key. Therefore, we guide our choice by
the literature on sickness absence behavior (Frick and Malo, 2008; Livanos
and Zangelidis, 2013; Puhani and Sonderhof, 2010; Ziebarth and Karlsson,
2010) and by the literature on sickness presenteeism (Arnold, forthcom-
ing; Aronsson et al., 2000; Aronsson and Gustafsson, 2005; Bo¨ckerman and
Laukkanen, 2009, 2010; Hansen and Andersen, 2008; Leineweber et al., 2011;
Preisendo¨rfer, 2010). Furthermore, we are interested to see whether HRM
measures reduce absence at the cost of presenteeism. We present a parsimo-
nious model as preferred specification excluding some insignificant explana-
tory variables, which does not change our results (see section 3.3).
In our main specification, we include rather formal job characteristics
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such as supervisory and blue collar status, temporary contracts, tenure cat-
egories (1-2 years, 3-14 years, ≥ 15 years), part time (10-30h per week), over
time (≥ 45h per week), flexible working time, firm size, industry (modified
NACE-17 classification) and sector information (private sector). To measure
the working conditions, we construct an index measuring adverse working
conditions. The index is a sum of dummy variables measuring whether the
individual is exposed half of the time or more to a number of adverse work-
ing conditions. These comprise: exposure to vibrations from hard tools
or machinery; to noise; high temperatures; low temperatures; breathing in
smoke, fumes, powder or dust; breathing in vapours; handling or being in
skin contact with chemical products or substances; breathing tobacco smoke
from other people; handling or being in direct contact with materials which
can be infectious; having a job that involves tiring or painful positions; lift-
ing or moving people; carrying or moving heavy loads; standing; performing
repetitive hand or arm movements; and handling angry clients or patients.
Additionally, we take subjective properties of a job into account such as work
autonomy, support by co-workers and the management, and time pressure
(lack of time to get work done).12 Finally, we include three HRM measures,
namely piece- or productivity pay, production targets that determine work
speed and individual formalized performance assessment. The correspond-
ing descriptive statistics of the two dependent variables and the work-related
characteristics are provided in Table 1.
Additionally to the work-related characteristics, we control for sociode-
mographic variables and health status (for descriptives of the controls see
Table A.1 in the Appendix A.2). As sociodemographic variables, we include
sex (female=1), having children, living with a partner, age categories (aged
18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-65 years), educational status (primary,
secondary and higher education status) and having financial problems as a
proxy for the household income.13
As argued in section 2.3.2, it is important to filter out individual hetero-
geneity in health as well as possible. Fortunately, the EWCS data offers a
12Work autonomy is captured by an index measuring the number of autonomy dimen-
sions in which the employee has control – specifically, work order, methods and speed.
The other subjective variables are measured on different Likert scales (see Table 1).
13The EWCS includes also a crude net income measure that exhibits many non-
responses. Including this variable does not change our findings. The respective estimations
are available upon request to the authors.
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rich set on health information that goes far beyond those included in other
labor market surveys. Hence, we do not only control for self-rated general
health (very good, good, fair and bad), which alone is already a very good
predictor of general health and mortality (Idler and Benyamini, 1997), but
we also include a set of dummy variables that measures specific diseases or
health issues from which the respondents have suffered within the last 12
months. The dummies on specific diseases and symptoms include: hearing
problems, skin problems, backache, muscular pain in shoulders, neck and/or
upper limbs, muscular pain in lower limbs, headaches and eyestrain, stom-
ach ache, respiratory difficulties, cardiovascular diseases, injuries, depression
or anxiety, overall fatigue, insomnia or general sleeping problems and other
health problems. Since absence and presenteeism behavior might not only
be affected by the respondent’s physical health, we also include a mental
health index. This index is a sum of five Likert scales measuring for the last
two weeks whether the respondent has ‘felt cheerful and in good spirits’,
‘felt calm and relaxed’, ‘felt active and vigorous’, ‘woken up feeling fresh
and rested’, and whether her or his ‘daily life has been filled with things
that interest [her or him]’. The index runs from zero to 25 with higher
values indicating better mental health.
Finally, we include country dummies in order to account for average
aggregated country differences in absence and presenteeism behavior that
might be due to country specific effects such as labor market institutions,
social norms, or health care institutions. In doing so, we indirectly control
also for the generosity of sick pay entitlements that strongly vary across
countries and affect absence behavior (Frick and Malo, 2008; Puhani and
Sonderhof, 2010; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2010).14
To find out whether a change of a work-related factor implies a sub-
stitutive, complementary or no relationship between sickness presenteeism
and absence, we investigate separately how they are related to the number
of presenteeism and absence days and classify them accordingly. A sub-
stitutive relationship between presenteeism and absence days is given if a
work-related factor leads to an opposite change in these two sickness states.
For a complementary relationship between presenteeism and absence days,
14We prefer country dummies in cross-sectional data since they are a general way to
control for cross country differences. Furthermore including both country dummies and
sick pay generosity is not feasible due to multi-collinearity.
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a work-related factor affects both sickness states at the same time either
positively or negatively. Finally, if a work related factor is either signifi-
cantly related to sickness presenteeism or absence, its relationship is neither
substitutive nor complementary.
We investigate the relationship between the work-related characteristics
and the number of presenteeism and absence days by estimating OLS regres-
sion models with cluster adjusted standard errors at the country level. Ad-
ditionally, we present the results from seemingly unrelated regression models
(SUR) which allow for the correlation of the error terms between both equa-
tions and hence take advantage of the fact that we observe absence and
presenteeism behavior of the same individuals (for SUR or system OLS, see
Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 143ff.). Since there is no panel data on presenteeism
available at the moment, we can offer only cross-sectional correlations, which
should be kept in mind when interpreting the ensuing results.
Despite having a count data structure, we prefer OLS to count data mod-
els since they are less contingent on distributional assumptions and easier to
interpret (for count data models, see Cameron and Trivedi, 1998, pp. 59ff.).
Particularly, assuming an average linear relationship between independent
and dependent variable, OLS models make it easier to draw a general pic-
ture with regards to a substitutive, a complementary or no relationship than
count data models where there might be different effects at different points
on the distribution. To be sure that our results do not depend on this sim-
plifying assumption, we present a Poisson regression model as a robustness
check in section 3.3.
The econometric model reads as follows:
absence/presenteeism daysi = α0 + workcharacteristics
′
iα1
+ sociodemographics′iα2 + healthstatus
′
iα3 + country
′
iα4 + i.
Presenteeism/absence daysi indicate the number of days either spent at
work while being sick or absent during 12 months for individual i. Work
characteristicsi, health statusi, and sociodemographicsi represent the differ-
ent vectors of independent variables. We include country dummies and i is
the error term.
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3.2 Results
The regression outcomes are depicted in Table 2, in which we present the
determinants of absence and presenteeism days in columns (1) and (2), re-
spectively. Since the coefficients in the OLS models are by construction the
same as in the SUR models, we present additionally the z-statistics of the
SUR models in squared brackets, which deliver virtually the same qualitative
results as the OLS models with one exception.
As our first result, we find that there are only few work-related vari-
ables that lead to a substitutive relationship. This is a very remarkable
finding because it is at odds with the common view in the literature that
employees’ choice between absence and presenteeism is a zero-sum game.
Furthermore, it suggests that the individual-specific definition of sickness
– the main innovation of our theoretical model – plays an important role
because non-substitutive relationships between both sickness states can only
be explained by sufficiently large changes in the sickness definition, as ex-
plained in section 2.3.2.
More specifically, being supervisor, working more than 45 hours per week
and being autonomous about the working time are associated with less ab-
sence days at the expense of more presenteeism days. This group could
be described as career-oriented employees because they work long hours
and take responsibility for their firm as supervisor, but have also autonomy
over their working time. Hence, one could argue that these employees have
incentives to come to work at a more severe health shock but without ad-
justing their sickness definition. Consequently, absence days decline while
presenteeism days increase. Note that the flexible time variable becomes
insignificant in the presenteeism regression in the SUR model.
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Table 2: Regression Results
(1) (2)
Absence Presenteeism
(OLS)[SUR] (OLS)[SUR]
Substitutes
Supervisor -0.503∗∗ (-2.19) [-2.12] 0.314∗∗∗ (3.12) [2.91]
Over time (≥ 45 h) -0.831∗∗∗ (-3.30) [-3.19] 0.485∗∗∗ (4.43) [4.09]
Flexibel time arr. -1.225∗∗∗ (-3.90) [-2.79] 0.223∗∗ (2.11) [1.12]
Complements
Adverse working condit. 0.233∗∗∗ (4.63) [6.04] 0.058∗∗ (2.45) [3.30]
Tenure (<1 years) (base) (base)
Tenure (1-2 years) 1.085∗∗∗ (3.54) [2.98] 0.597∗∗∗ (3.28) [3.61]
Tenure (3-14 years) 1.728∗∗∗ (4.29) [4.96] 0.702∗∗∗ (3.52) [4.41]
Tenure (≥ 15 years) 1.671∗∗∗ (3.46) [4.26] 1.047∗∗∗ (4.66) [5.88]
Only absence
Private sector -0.928∗∗∗ (-4.99) [-4.19] 0.014 (0.18) [0.14]
Temporary contract -0.960∗∗∗ (-3.61) [-3.46] -0.069 (-0.57) [-0.54]
Part time (10-30h) -0.685∗ (-1.80) [-2.44] -0.146 (-0.78) [-1.15]
Size (<10 employees) (base) (base)
Size (10-49 employees) 0.719∗∗∗ (3.57) [3.43] 0.084 (0.76) [0.88]
Size (50-99 employees) 0.655∗∗ (2.39) [2.35] 0.007 (0.06) [0.06]
Size (100-249 employees) 1.045∗∗∗ (3.20) [3.51] 0.287∗ (1.95) [2.12]
Size (>250 employees) 1.418∗∗∗ (4.19) [4.95] 0.135 (1.14) [1.03]
Only presenteeism
Work autonomy -0.083 (-0.99) [-1.11] 0.156∗∗∗ (3.16) [4.62]
Lack of time -0.106 (-0.89) [-1.20] 0.157∗∗∗ (3.04) [3.92]
Production targets -0.013 (-0.07) [-0.07] 0.198∗∗∗ (2.90) [2.43]
Performance assessment 0.065 (0.28) [0.38] 0.218∗∗ (2.25) [2.79]
Social support -0.025 (-0.39) [-0.53] -0.085∗∗∗ (-3.69) [-4.03]
Blue collar 0.224 (0.92) [0.95] -0.186∗ (-1.92) [-1.75]
Insignificant
Piece or product. rate 0.116 (0.46) [0.45] -0.079 (-0.75) [-0.68]
Control variables Yes Yes
Health controls Yes Yes
N 18804 18804
R2 0.12 0.14
Source: 2010-EWCS, own calculations. Notes: Coefficient estimates are from OLS regressions. The dependent
variables are the number of sickness absence days in columns (1) and the number of sickness presenteeism
days in column (2), including those with zero days. All variables shown in the table except adverse working
conditions, lack of time, work autonomy and social support are dummies (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics).
Sociodemographic variables as well as country and industry dummies are included as control variables but are
not shown. The sociodemographic controls comprise sex, having children, partnership status, age categories,
financial problems and educational status. The health control variables include self rated health status (3
dummies), 14 different symptoms and diseases from which the respondent suffered during the last 12 months
as well as an index measuring mental health. T-statistics based on standard errors clustered on the country
level are in parentheses, z-statistics from SUR regression in squared brackets. The correlation coefficient of
the residuals in the SUR amounts to 0.0977. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.22
The second result of our empirical investigation is that only a few com-
plementary relationships exist between absence and presenteeism days with
respect to work-related factors.15 To be more specific, adverse working con-
ditions and tenure are positive and significantly related to both sickness
categories. Accordingly, longer tenure as well as worse working conditions
give employees an incentive to stay at home even for less severe health shocks
which raises absence days. At the same time, the employees’ definition of
sickness is widened by both factors such that more health shocks are con-
sidered as sick which raises presenteeism days.
As shown in Table 2, the majority of the work-related factors is either
related to sickness absence days or to presenteeism days while being uncorre-
lated with the other. Let us first look at the case in which absence behavior
changes while presenteeism remains unaffected. Working under a tempo-
rary contract and in the private sector are associated with significantly less
absence days (part time only at the ten per cent significance level), while
working in a larger plant is positively related to the number of absence days.
In our theoretical model, this pattern can be explained if there is illegit-
imate absence instead of presenteeism. Individuals then decide to be absent
from the workplace without considering the respective health shock as sick.
Accordingly, temporary contracts, employment in the private sector and in
smaller firms make particularly illegitimate absence more costly. This might
be explained by less employment protection in these jobs which has been
shown to affect absence behavior (cf. Riphahn, 2004; Ichino and Riphahn,
2005). Although there is a reduction of absence, these characteristics do not,
in this case, come at the cost of increased presenteeism. With data collected
in 2010, on the peak of the economic crisis in Europe with its increasing
unemployment and general economic insecurity, which should increase ef-
fort in form of presenteeism particularly among those with low employment
protection, it is a strong result that we find only differences in absence but
none in presenteeism.
Finally, we consider the case where presenteeism changes while absence
is unaffected. As shown in Table 2, subjective work load (lack of time),
15This lack in substitutes and complements is not a specific result for the work-related
characteristics but does hold also true for the sociodemographics. Here, only sex leads to
a complementary relationship between absence and presenteeism. Self-rated health status
and some of the specific illness dummies are significantly related to both sickness states,
too.
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work autonomy and two of the HRM measures (production target and for-
mal performance assessment) are highly significantly associated with more
sickness presenteeism days, while support by colleagues and management is
highly significantly associated with less (blue collar only at the ten per cent
level). As our theoretical model explains this pattern by differences in the
individual sickness definition, these results suggest that pressure on the em-
ployee (work load and performance assessment) and support of the employee
affect perceived sickness in an oppositional way. From the perspective of a
manager, the existence of this category is interesting because it highlights
possibilities to reduce presenteeism without the threat of higher absence.
3.3 Robustness Checks
As robustness checks, we use count data models as well as OLS models
in differently defined (sub)samples and provide the respective estimation
results in Appendix A.2. Estimating a Poisson regression model confirms
our results from the OLS regressions (see columns 1 and 2 in Table A.2).
Restricting our sample to EU member states which are characterized by
a more homogeneous institutional setting (columns 3 and 4 in Table A.2)
does not fundamentally alter our results, either. Only the part time variable
becomes insignificant in this sample.
As a further robustness check, we restrict our sample to employees that
have been sick during the last 12 months because one can only substitute
between sickness states when being sick at all (columns 5 and 6 in Ta-
ble A.2). In this sample, we find one additional substitutive relationship,
namely work autonomy. Here, work autonomy is associated with less ab-
sence and more presenteeism days, while the qualitative findings for the
other controls remain mostly stable. Being associated with responsibility
and intrinsic motivation, work autonomy fits quite well into the group of
the other substitutes.
Finally, we do some further sensitivity checks that are not presented in
Table A.2.16 Including (some) of the outliers, i.e. those with up to 150
absence or presenteeism days in 12 months, does not fundamentally change
our results. Specifically, flexible working time becomes insignificant in the
presenteeism regression, while supervisor is only significant at the ten per
16The respective estimation results are available upon request from the authors.
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cent level in both regressions. In contrast, blue collar status becomes highly
statistically significant in the presenteeism regression. Hence, only over time
and supervisor status – albeit less significantly – remain substitutes in these
models. This could be seen as a sign that substitution plays rather a role in
a sample of employees with less severe health issues which allows them to
actually reduce absence at the cost of presenteeism.
To see whether our results are sensible to the exclusion of employees with
particularly severe health issues, we rerun our models excluding employees
having suffered during the last twelve months from a.) injuries (around
eight per cent of the sample) or b.) other (non listed) health problems
(around three per cent).17 Again, the results are virtually unchanged in
these two sub-samples. Only flexible working time becomes insignificant in
both presenteeism models. Finally, results are not qualitatively affected by
the inclusion of further work-related characteristics that turned out to be
insignificant at conventional levels and hence were excluded from our pre-
ferred specification. The additional controls comprise work interdependence
(whether work speed depends on others), whether working during evenings
or weekends, a categorical income measure (21 categories) and perceived job
insecurity (5 point Likert scale).
4 Summary
How are work-related factors simultaneously related to sickness absence and
presenteeism? To address this question, we explore a theoretical and em-
pirical analysis. Using cross-sectional data from the EWCS, we find in OLS
regressions that only three out of 17 work-related factors, namely supervisor
status, over time and flexible working time, show a substitutive relationship
between absence and presenteeism. This finding is at odds with the predomi-
nant view in the literature that presenteeism behavior is simply the residuum
of sickness absence. In addition, there are also only two work-related fac-
tors, namely working conditions and tenure, for which a complementary
relationship between both sickness states can be observed.
The bulk of work-related factors is only related to one of the sickness
states while leaving the other unaffected. This finding shows that it might
17These are the two least prevalent illness categories that are particularly strongly re-
lated to both sickness states. Excluding those with cardiovascular or respiratory disease
does not qualitatively change our results either.
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be possible to reduce either absence or presenteeism without shifting the
negative productivity effect of sickness to the other sickness state, hence
possibly raising the overall number of unimpaired working days. Finally, we
are able to identify situations which are associated with absenteeism and
that would benefit from according measures. This is the case for employees
in the public sector, in larger firms and with open-ended contracts who are
associated with more absence but not fewer presenteeism days. Our results
are remarkably robust against count data models and in differently defined
sub-samples.
In our theoretical model, we show that non-substitutive relationships
between absences and presenteeism (with respect to work-related factors)
can be explained by shifts in the individual-specific definition of sickness.
If, for instance, a change in one work-related factor implies more absence
days, this would, c.p., be combined with reduction of presenteeism days.
This effect interacts, however, with a change in the sickness definition. If
the same work-related factor implies that individuals consider more health
shocks as sick, presenteeism days would, c.p., increase. If the latter effect is
strong enough, absence and presenteeism days could simultaneously rise with
respect to the work-related factor. Presenteeism days remain unchanged
if the aforementioned effects cancel out or if there is absenteeism. If, in
turn, the sickness definition changes but the individuals’ absence decision
does not vary, only presenteeism days will adjust. The fact that the non-
substitutive relationship between absence and presenteeism is the dominant
empirical finding thus indicates the importance of the individual-specific
sickness definition.
A Appendix
A.1 Theoretical Model
As in the main text, we assume that δ is randomly distributed over the inter-
val [0, 1] with the density f(δ), where we suppress the index i for notational
simplification. The distribution function is denoted by F (δ), with F (0) = 0,
F (1) = 1 and ∂F/∂δ > 0. The probability of absence reads:
A = F (θ < δ < 1) = 1− F (θ),
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which implies:
∂A
∂θ
= −∂F
∂θ
< 0. (A.1)
The probability of presenteeism is given by:
P = F (φ < δ < θ) = F (θ)− F (φ),
which leads to:
∂P
∂θ
=
∂F
∂θ
> 0 and
∂P
∂φ
= −∂F
∂φ
< 0. (A.2)
With (A.1) and (A.2) at hand, we can rewrite (11) as:
dA =
∂A
∂θ︸︷︷︸
<0
dθ > (≤) 0⇔ dθ < (≥) 0. (A.3)
If dθ < 0 (and thus dA > 0) holds, we get from (12):
dP =
∂P
∂θ︸︷︷︸
>0
dθ︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂P
∂φ︸︷︷︸
<0
dφ < 0⇔ dφ ≥ 0 or dφ < 0 and |Γ1| > |Γ2| , (A.4)
dP =
∂P
∂θ︸︷︷︸
>0
dθ︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂P
∂φ︸︷︷︸
<0
dφ ≥ 0⇔ dφ < 0 and |Γ1| ≤ |Γ2| , (A.5)
with Γ1 ≡ (∂P/∂θ)dθ and Γ2 ≡ (∂P/∂φ)dφ. If instead dθ ≥ 0 (and thus
dA ≤ 0) holds, we find [see (13)]:
dP =
∂P
∂θ︸︷︷︸
>0
dθ︸︷︷︸
≥0
+
∂P
∂φ︸︷︷︸
<0
dφ > 0⇔ dφ ≤ 0 or dφ > 0 and |Γ1| > |Γ2| , (A.6)
dP =
∂P
∂θ︸︷︷︸
>0
dθ︸︷︷︸
≥0
+
∂P
∂φ︸︷︷︸
<0
dφ ≤ 0⇔ dφ > 0 and |Γ1| ≤ |Γ2| . (A.7)
Observing (A.4) and (A.6), we find that presenteeism and absence are
substitutes (i) if the variations in θ and φ are oppositional or (ii) if the
changes of θ and φ have the same sign but the weighted (absolute) change
in φ is sufficiently weak. This finding corresponds with Proposition 1. In
addition, (A.5) and (A.7) imply that presenteeism and absence are com-
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plements if the changes in θ and φ have the same sign and the weighted
(absolute) change in φ is sufficiently strong. This confirms Proposition 2.
Finally, (A.5) and (A.7) also show that presenteeism and absence are nei-
ther substitutes nor complements (i) if θ remains constant while φ changes
or (ii) if the weighted changes in θ and φ are identical, which is equivalent
to Proposition 3.
A.2 Empirical Analysis
Figure A.1: Distribution of sickness absence and presenteeism days conditional on absence
and presenteeism. Observations with zero sickness absence and presenteeism days not
shown but included in analysis (53 and 62 % of the full sample, respectively). Source:
2010-EWCS. Own calculations.
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Table A.1: Control Variables (Descriptive Statistics)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Socio-demographic controls
Sex (female=1) 18,804 0.45 0.50 0 1
Children 18,804 0.53 0.50 0 1
Partnership 18,804 0.74 0.44 0 1
Age (18-24 years) 18,804 0.07 0.26 0 1
Age (25-34 years) 18,804 0.25 0.44 0 1
Age (35-44 years) 18,804 0.29 0.45 0 1
Age (45-54 years) 18,804 0.27 0.44 0 1
Age (55-65 years) 18,804 0.11 0.32 0 1
Primary education 18,804 0.31 0.46 0 1
Secondary education 18,804 0.34 0.47 0 1
Higher education 18,804 0.35 0.48 0 1
Financial problems 18,804 0.36 0.48 1 1
Health status
Very good health 18,804 0.26 0.44 0 1
Good health 18,804 0.55 0.50 0 1
Fair health 18,804 0.18 0.38 0 1
Bad health 18,804 0.01 0.12 0 1
Mental health index 18,804 16.7 4.9 0 25
Hearing problems 18,804 0.06 0.23 0 1
Skin problems 18,804 0.08 0.27 0 1
Back ache 18,804 0.45 0.50 0 1
Muscular pain in upper limbs 18,804 0.42 0.50 0 1
Muscular pain in lower limbs 18,804 0.28 0.45 0 1
Headaches and eyestrain 18,804 0.40 0.49 0 1
Stomach ache 18,804 0.13 0.34 0 1
Respiratory difficulties 18,804 0.05 0.22 0 1
Cardiovascular diseases 18,804 0.04 0.19 0 1
Injuries 18,804 0.08 0.27 0 1
Depression or anxiety 18,804 0.08 0.28 0 1
Overall fatigue 18,804 0.35 0.48 0 1
Insomnia or general sleeping problems 18,804 0.18 0.48 0 1
Other health problems 18,804 0.02 0.15 0 1
Source: 2010-EWCS. Own calculations, survey weights used.
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Table A.2: Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Absence Presenteeism Absence Presenteeism Absence Presenteeism
Poisson EU-27 Conditional on sickness
Supervisor -0.539∗∗ (-2.19) 0.300∗∗∗ (3.20) -0.618∗∗ (-2.58) 0.267∗∗ (2.39) -0.677∗ (-1.91) 0.525∗∗∗ (3.74)
Over time (≥ 45h) -0.813∗∗∗ (-2.91) 0.457∗∗∗ (5.06) -0.807∗∗ (-2.76) 0.610∗∗∗ (5.00) -1.405∗∗∗ (-3.53) 0.826∗∗∗ (5.20)
Flexibel time arr. -1.439∗∗∗ (-3.19) 0.252∗∗∗ (2.60) -1.073∗∗∗ (-4.32) 0.230∗∗ (2.13) -1.467∗∗∗ (-3.52) 0.417∗∗∗ (2.97)
Adverse working condit. 0.198∗∗∗ (4.76) 0.055∗∗ (2.57) 0.255∗∗∗ (4.72) 0.066∗∗ (2.59) 0.328∗∗∗ (4.17) 0.080∗∗ (2.26)
Tenure (1-2 years) 1.505∗∗∗ (3.03) 0.668∗∗∗ (3.09) 1.280∗∗∗ (3.79) 0.614∗∗∗ (3.11) 0.754 (1.34) 0.444∗ (1.70)
Tenure (3-14 years) 2.271∗∗∗ (3.66) 0.830∗∗∗ (3.61) 2.006∗∗∗ (4.84) 0.679∗∗∗ (3.26) 1.482∗∗ (2.10) 0.490∗ (1.86)
Tenure (≥ 15 years) 2.152∗∗∗ (3.04) 1.153∗∗∗ (4.81) 1.996∗∗∗ (4.00) 0.980∗∗∗ (4.20) 0.991 (1.25) 0.916∗∗∗ (2.80)
Private sector -0.919∗∗∗ (-4.96) 0.036 (0.49) -0.903∗∗∗ (-4.84) 0.058 (0.69) -1.432∗∗∗ (-6.30) 0.055 (0.51)
Temporary contract -1.045∗∗∗ (-2.95) 0.003 (0.02) -0.771∗∗∗ (-2.99) -0.062 (-0.48) -1.631∗∗∗ (-4.06) 0.030 (0.15)
Part time (10-30h) -0.908∗∗ (-2.23) -0.174 (-0.84) -0.658 (-1.64) -0.050 (-0.25) -0.712 (-1.33) 0.025 (0.08)
Size (10-49 employees) 0.760∗∗∗ (3.54) 0.102 (0.86) 0.813∗∗∗ (3.68) 0.175 (1.46) 1.161∗∗∗ (3.93) 0.124 (0.74)
Size (50-99 employees) 0.696∗∗ (2.37) 0.071 (0.54) 0.621∗∗ (2.22) 0.027 (0.22) 0.669∗ (1.70) -0.059 (-0.33)
Size (100-249 employees) 1.058∗∗∗ (3.29) 0.326∗∗ (2.11) 1.146∗∗∗ (3.19) 0.348∗∗ (2.09) 1.347∗∗∗ (3.03) 0.269 (1.27)
Size (>250 employees) 1.332∗∗∗ (3.98) 0.171 (1.40) 1.413∗∗∗ (4.02) 0.181 (1.42) 1.726∗∗∗ (3.93) 0.002 (0.01)
Work autonomy -0.089 (-1.07) 0.185∗∗∗ (3.90) -0.056 (-0.65) 0.211∗∗∗ (4.65) -0.247∗∗ (-2.05) 0.236∗∗∗ (3.95)
Lack of time -0.114 (-1.03) 0.114∗∗∗ (3.24) -0.123 (-0.97) 0.144∗∗ (2.62) -0.240 (-1.50) 0.181∗∗∗ (3.04)
Production targets -0.106 (-0.59) 0.173∗∗∗ (2.66) 0.087 (0.41) 0.205∗∗ (2.71) -0.290 (-1.19) 0.209∗∗ (2.17)
Performance assessment 0.062 (0.27) 0.200∗∗∗ (2.66) 0.062 (0.24) 0.236∗∗ (2.17) -0.299 (-0.87) 0.175 (1.41)
Social support -0.020 (-0.35) -0.086∗∗∗ (-3.91) -0.055 (-0.87) -0.107∗∗∗ (-4.94) 0.012 (0.13) -0.128∗∗∗ (-3.65)
Blue collar 0.253 (1.05) -0.200∗∗ (-2.26) 0.273 (1.00) -0.177∗ (-1.77) 0.673∗ (1.76) -0.193 (-1.22)
Piece rate 0.090 (0.38) -0.090 (-0.92) 0.070 (0.25) -0.089 (-0.88) 0.252 (0.57) -0.067 (-0.38)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 18804 18804 16585 16585 11656 11656
R2 0.12 0.14 0.11 0.12
Source: 2010-EWCS, own calculations. Notes: Average marginal effects from Poisson regression in Columns (1) and (2), coefficient estimates
from OLS regressions in Columns (3)-(6). The dependent variables are the number of sickness absence days in columns (1), (3) and (5) and the
number of sickness presenteeism days in column (2), (4) and (6), both including those with zero days. All variables shown in the table except
adverse working conditions, lack of time, work autonomy, social support, are dummies (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). Sociodemographic
variables as well as country and industry dummies are included as control variables but are not shown. The sociodemographic controls comprise
sex, having children, partnership status, age categories, financial problems and educational status. The health control variables include self
rated health status (3 dummies), 14 different symptoms and diseases from which the respondent suffered during the last 12 months as well
as an index measuring mental health. The first two estimations rely on the full sample of 18,804 observations. Columns (3) and (4) rely on
the observations from the EU-27 countries, i.e. 16,585 observations, and columns (5) and (6) rely only on observations that have at least one
sickness day, be it absence or presenteeism (11,656 observations). T-statistics based on standard errors clustered on the country level are in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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